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NOTE
THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT: HOW WILL THE SYSTEM
LOOK AFTER RING V. ARIZONA?
CASEY LAFFEYt

INTRODUCTION

Throughout American legal history, there has never been a
more controversial topic than the death penalty. Until recently,
a capital defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial1 did
not extend to the determination of aggravating factors that
2
would allow imposition of the death penalty under state law.
Historically, that question was decided by a judge. In Ring v.
Arizona,3 a six-member majority of the United States Supreme
Court 4 held that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee
requires that a jury must find the existence of any aggravating
factor legally necessary for imposition of the death penalty
beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 This decision will significantly
affect the way each state's criminal justice system addresses
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.A.., State
University of New York at Binghampton, 2000.
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
2 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990) (holding that Arizona's
capital sentencing system did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the
determination of aggravating circumstances did not qualify as an "element of the
crime of capital murder"), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428
(2002).
3 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002); 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4 Id. at 2432. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas
formed the majority. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, while Justices
O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id.
5 Id. at 2432 (stating that "[clapital defendants... are entitled to a jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment").
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capital punishment, particularly those permitting death
sentencing by judicial decision.
This Note will analyze how the Ring decision will affect
death penalty systems in states that have judicial capital
sentencing systems and will explore Ring's effect on the
hundreds of convicted defendants sitting on death row. Part I
will analyze the issue in Ring as well as the state and federal
struggles to distinguish two prior Supreme Court decisions that
addressed sentencing procedures and the reasons that the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Part II will discuss the facts
and holding of Ring and try to clarify any ambiguity surrounding
the scope of the decision. Parts III and IV will provide a more
detailed discussion of the decision, its effect, the disruption of
death penalty systems in nine states, and the need to resentence
many convicted capital defendants under a jury system. Part V
will analyze the unprecedented changes in the capital
punishment system in the United States caused by Ring.
I.

PROBLEMS LEADING UP TO RING
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ring to resolve the
difficulty courts were having distinguishing two of the its prior
holdings, 6 Walton v. Arizona 7 and Apprendi v. New Jersey.8 In
Walton, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree felony
murder 9 under Arizona's penal code for the death of Thomas
Powell. 10 In accordance with Arizona's sentencing procedures,"
the trial judge conducted a separate sentencing hearing without
a jury. He determined that certain statutory aggravating
6 Id.
at 2436 ("We granted Ring's petition for a writ of certiorari to allay
uncertainty in the lower courts caused by the manifest tension between Walton and
the reasoning ofApprendi." (internal citations omitted)).
7 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
8 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
9 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(2) (West Supp. 2002) (outlining the
elements of first-degree felony murder as "[a]cting either alone or with one or more
other persons the person commits" one of certain enumerated felonies).
1o See State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Ariz. 1989) (discussing how Walton
and two accomplices robbed Powell at gunpoint, forced him into his car, and drove
out to the desert where Walton forced him to lie face down on the ground and shot
him in the head), affd 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 122
S.Ct. 2428 (2002).
11 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 2001) (providing for a separate
sentencing hearing to determine whether defendants convicted of first-degree
murder should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment).
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12
circumstances were established and sentenced Walton to death.
After the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Walton's conviction
and sentence, 13 the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine the constitutionality of Arizona's capital
sentencing system. 14
Walton argued that a jury should
determine every sentencing decision conditioned upon a finding
of fact and that because Arizona law permitted factual
determinations to be made by a judge rather than a jury,
Arizina's sentencing system was unconstitutional. 15
In
upholding Walton's sentence, the Court held that Arizona's
sentencing system did not violate the Sixth Amendment because
the aggravating circumstances found by the judge qualified as
sentencing considerations rather than as an element of the
offense. 16 The Court buttressed its decision by citing Cabana v.
Bullock, 17 which upheld an appellate court's power to determine
whether a "defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to
kill" in order to qualify a defendant for the death sentence for
first-degree felony murder.' 8 Relying on Cabana, the Court
noted that even though defendants convicted of felony murder
could not be put to death without a finding of one of these facts,
such factual findings were not "a new element of the crime of
capital murder that must be found by the jury."19 The Court
analogized the Cabana decision to Arizona's capital sentencing
system in holding:
If the Constitution does not require that the Edmund finding be
prove[n] as an element of the offense of capital murder, and
does not require a jury to make [such a] finding, we cannot
conclude that a State is required to denominate aggravating

12 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 645 (1990) (stating that the trial judge
found that Walton committed the crime "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner" and that "the murder was committed for pecuniary gain," two statutorily
enumerated aggravating factors qualifying a defendant for the death penalty).

13 See State v Walton, 769 P.2d at 1038 (finding no reversible error).

14 See Walton v. Arizona, 493 U.S. 808 (1989).
15 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647.
16 See id. at 649 ("[W]e cannot conclude that a State is required to denominate
aggravating circumstances 'elements' of the offense or permit only a jury to

determine the existence of such circumstances.").
17474 U.S. 376 (1986).
18 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 648-49; Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986).
19 Walton, 497 U.S. at 649 (quoting Cabana,474 U.S. at 385 n.3).
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circumstances "elements" of the offense or permit only a jury to
20
determine the existence of such circumstances.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New
Jersey that a New Jersey statute that enhanced sentences for
defendants committing hate crimes 21 violated a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to "a jury determination that [he] is
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged,
beyond a reasonable doubt." 22 In Apprendi, a jury convicted the
defendant of second-degree possession of a firearm, 23 a crime
normally carrying a maximum penalty of ten years. 24 Under
New Jersey's hate crime enhancement statute, 25 however, the
26
trial judge determined that the crime was motivated by race
and sentenced the defendant to twelve years in prison.27 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that any stateimposed increase in a defendant's authorized punishment that is
conditioned upon a finding of fact is unconstitutional unless the
28
jury finds that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Initially, the Court relied upon historical background and
noted that the right to a trial by jury has always required that
"'the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of
indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the
defendant's] equals and neighbours.'"29 Second, "'[w]here a
20 Id. at 649. The court refers to the finding that the defendant killed,
attempted to kill, or intended to kill as the "Edmund finding," citing Edmund v.

Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
21 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 (2000) (stating that hate
crimes in New Jersey were those committed with the intent "to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity").
22 Id. at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 510 (1995)).
23 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 2002) (stating that "[any person who
has in his possession any firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the
person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree").
24 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468.
25 See id. at 470 (discussing how New Jersey enhanced sentencing for crimes
committed with "a biased purpose").
26 Id. at 471.
27
28

Id.

Id. at 482-83 (pronouncing that a defendant may not be "expose[d]... to a
penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts
reflected in the jury verdict alone").
29 Id. at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)).
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of punishment to a...

felony.., in order to bring a defendant within that higher
degree of punishment, [the indictment] must expressly charge it
to have been committed ... and must state the circumstances

with certainty and precision.' "30 The Court further emphasized
that defining the requirement of racial animus as a sentence
enhancement did not justify treating it differently from any
other fact that must be stated in an indictment and proven to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 31 In applying the historical
concerns embodied in the Sixth Amendment to New Jersey's
statute, the Court held that a legislature could not "remove[ the
jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the
criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he
would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the
32
jury verdict alone."
Subsequent courts have struggled with Walton's continued
applicability in light of Apprendi.33 The Fourth Circuit has called
it "perplexing" that a jury is required for factual findings of drug
quantities while they are not essential for determining the
presence or absence of aggravating factors justifying imposition
of a capital sentence. 34 In addition, the Ninth Circuit stated that
although "Apprendi may raise some doubt about Walton," the
lower courts are still required to apply Walton to capital cases
3
until the Supreme Court expressly overrules it.
5 Similarly, in

her dissent in Apprendi, Justice O'Connor referred to the Court's
distinction of Walton36 as "baffling."3v She stated that Walton
was grounded on the view that the Constitution does not require
a jury to make the factual determinations required for
imposition of the death penalty. 38 She argued that if the
majority intended to hold that facts used to justify a sentencing
30 Id. at 480 (quoting 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *170, in J. ARCHBOLD,
PLEADING & EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 51 (15th ed. 1862)).
31 Id. at 494-97.

32 Id. at 482-83.
33 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-84.

34 United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 159-60 (4th Cir. 2001).
35 Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 542 (9th Cir. 2001).
36 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97 (distinguishing Walton on the grounds that
death was the maximum sentence for first-degree murder in Arizona and judicial

determination of aggravated factors was simply a determination between a
maximum or lesser penalty).
37Id. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
38 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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enhancement must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, "one would be hard pressed to tell [this] from the opinion
[the majority] issues [in Walton]."39 Accordingly, it became clear
that the Supreme Court needed to clarify the constitutionality of
judicial determination of so-called capital sentencing factors and
overrule either Walton or Apprendi.

II. RING V. ARIZONA
A.

FactualBackground and the Lower Courts

In Ring v. Arizona, defendant Timothy Ring was accused of
murdering the driver of an armored Wells Fargo van and
40
stealing more than $562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks.
After receiving a tip from an informant and discovering that
Ring made several expensive cash purchases, the Glendale,
Arizona police department placed wiretaps on the telephones of
Ring, his friend James Greenham, and a third suspect, William
Ferguson. 4 1 After monitoring Ring and Greenham's phone
conversations over the next couple of months and hearing Ring
tell Ferguson that "[his house] contain[ed] a very large bag," the
police obtained and executed a search warrant at Ring's house
42
and recovered a duffel bag containing over $271,000 in cash.
At trial, Ring claimed that the money seized at his house
was for a construction company that he and Greenman were
planning to start and that he had earned money as an informant
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a bail bondsman,
and gunsmith. 43 The prosecution called an FBI agent who
44
testified that Ring had only been paid $458 as an informant;
other evidence showed that Ring's income had not exceeded
$8,800 as a bondsman and gunsmith.45 The prosecution also
39 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40 Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432-33 (2002). On November 28, 1994, the
van pulled up to the Dillard's department store in Glendale, Arizona and a

passenger, Dave Moss, went inside the store to pick up money. Id. at 2432. When he
returned, the van and the driver were missing. Id. Later that same day, the
Maricopa County Sheriffs Department found the van in a church parking lot, and
the driver, John Magoch, dead inside from a single gunshot to the head. Id. at 243233.

41 Id. at 2433.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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introduced a note found in Ring's house with the amount
$575,995 and the letters '"Y and "T" written on it.46 The
prosecution argued that the letter "Y" stood for "Yoda," which
was Greenman's nickname and that the letter "T" stood for
"Timothy Ring."47 Charged with an instruction on both firstdegree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder, the
jury deadlocked on the count of premeditated murder"8 but
convicted Ring of first-degree felony murder for homicide in the
49
course of an armed robbery.
The Supreme Court has held that for a defendant convicted
of first-degree felony murder to be eligible for the death penalty,
the Eighth Amendment requires a finding that the defendant
either "killed or attempted to kill"50 or was a "major participa[nt]
in the

felony committed ...

[and

demonstrated]

reckless

indifference to human life."5 1 To establish this, the prosecution
called James Greenham, Ring's accomplice, to testify that Ring
was the shooter. 52 Relying on his testimony, the trial judge held
that Ring was the shooter and was therefore eligible for the
53
death penalty.
Under Arizona law, upon a jury conviction of first-degree
murder, the trial judge must hold a sentencing hearing without a
jury.54 At the hearing, a judge determines whether specifically
enumerated "aggravating circumstances"5 5 and "mitigating
circumstances" 56 are present. In order to sentence the defendant
to death, the judge must find at least one aggravating
circumstance and must conclude that "there are no mitigating
46 Id.
47 Id.

48 Id. (stating that six of twelve jurors voted to acquit Ring of premeditated
murder).
49 Id.
50 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).

51 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
52 See Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2435. Greenham had agreed to plead guilty to second-

degree murder and armed robbery in exchange for cooperation in the prosecution
against Ring. Id.
53 Id.
54 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 2001) (explaining that the hearing

must be "before the court alone").
55 Id.

§ 13-703(F) (describing the ten enumerated aggravating circumstances

that the sentencing judge can consider).
56 Id. § 13-703(G) (listing five enumerated mitigating circumstances that the
court can consider). However, the judge is "not limited to" only those five factors.
Id.
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circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."57 At

Ring's sentencing hearing, the trial judge found two statutory
aggravating factors: first, that Ring committed the offense in
order to receive an item of "pecuniary value,"58 and second, that
he committed the offense "in an especially heinous, cruel and
depraved manner."5 9 The judge recognized one mitigating
factor-Ring's minimal criminal record 6 0-but stated that it did
not "call for leniency" 61 and concluded that Ring should be
62
sentenced to death.
Ring appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court. He claimed
that Arizona's capital sentencing system violated the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.
He cited
Apprendi to support the argument that the system wrongfully
permitted a judge to determine findings of fact necessary to raise
a defendant's maximum penalty above that which could be
imposed based on the facts of the jury verdict alone.63 In
response, the state argued that the Supreme Court had already
64
upheld the constitutionality of its sentencing scheme in Walton.
Although the Arizona court noted that Apprendi and Jones v.
United States65 "raise[d] some question[s] about the continued
viability of Walton,"66 it held that Walton was still binding
authority and would remain so until expressly overruled by the
67
United States Supreme Court.

57 Id. § 13-703(E).
58 Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2435; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5) (West

2001).
59 Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2435; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (West

2001).
60 Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2435; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G) (West
2001) ("The court shall consider as mitigating circumstances any factors...
including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record.").
61 Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436.
62 Id.
63 State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1150 (Ariz. 2001).
64 Id.

65 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (holding that a separate determination of serious bodily

injury necessary to raise a maximum sentence must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt).
66 State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1150.

67 Id. at 1152.
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The Case in the Supreme Court

On appeal, in a majority opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg, the United States Supreme Court overruled Walton
and held that all defendants are "entitled to a jury determination
of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in
their maximum punishment." 68 In attacking the State of
Arizona's argument that their first-degree murder statute only
leaves the judge a sentencing option of death or life
imprisonment, 69 Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed Apprendi's
statement that "'the relevant inquiry is not of form, but of
effect'"70 and stated that "'the required finding [of an
aggravating circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict.' "71
She found that Arizona's first-degree murder statute
"'authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal
sense' "72 because death cannot be awarded without a finding of
73
fact that certain aggravating circumstances are present.
Ironically, she relied on Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in
Apprendi, emphasizing that there is "'no specific reason for
excepting
capital
defendants
from
the
constitutional
protections... extend[ed] to defendants generally, and none is
readily apparent.' ",74 Justice Ginsburg stated that Apprendi was
correct in holding that the characterization of a fact or
circumstance as an "element" or a "sentencing factor" does not
ultimately resolve the question of a judge or jury
determination. 75
Further, she reasoned that if the mere
characterization of a fact as a "sentencing factor" was enough to
take the determination out of the hands of a jury, the rule in

68 Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002).

69 Id. at 2440.
70 Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).

71 Id. at 2440 (quotingApprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (alteration in the original).
72 Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541).
73 Id.

74 Id. at 2442 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting))
(alteration in the original).
75 Id. at 2441. Justice Ginsburg quoted Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19, as
stating "[W]hen the term 'sentencing enhancement' is used to describe an increase

beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the fimctional equivalent
of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilt verdict."
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Apprendi would "be reduced to a 'meaningless and formalistic'
76
rule of statutory drafting."
Arizona argued that judicial determination of aggravating
factors would be a more efficient way to guarantee against the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.77 Justice Ginsburg
replied that "[t]he Sixth Amendment jury trial right... does not
turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential
fact finders."7 8
She quoted Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Apprendi:
Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts necessary to support a
death sentence might be "an admirably fair and efficient
scheme of criminal justice designed for a society that is
prepared to leave criminal justice to the State .... The founders
of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it to the
State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the
least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never
been efficient; but it has always been free. '79
Appreciating that Walton and Apprendi could not stand
together,8 0 the Court overruled Walton and extended the holding
of Apprendi to capital as well as non-capital determinations. 8 '
Specifically, the Court held that the aggravating factors needed
to impose a capital sentence must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt because "[tihe right to trial by jury guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it
[did not] encompass the fact finding necessary ... to put [a
defendant] to death."8 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia applauded the
holding in Apprendi. He reemphasized the view stated by
Justice Ginsburg that "the fundamental meaning of the jurytrial guarantee ... is that all facts essential to imposition of the
level of punishment that the defendant receives-whether
76

Id. (quotingApprendi, 530 U.S. at 543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).

77 Id. at 2442.

Id.
Id. (quotingApprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)). Ginsburg also
stated that "[t]hroughout [English and American] history, the jury determined
which homicide defendants would be subject to capital punishment by making
factual determinations ... [and] [bly the time the Bill or Rights was adopted, the
jury's right to make these determinations was unquestioned." Id. at 2438 (quoting
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710-11 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
80 Id. at 2443.
78
79

81 Id.
82

Id.
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[called] elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary
83
Jane-must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Scalia noted that for the past twelve years, he watched
as legislatures increasingly delegated sentencing factor decisions
to judges, fearing that the "traditional belief in the right of trial
by jury [was] in perilous decline."84 He explained that if a state
could fashion a way to have a jury determine the existence or
nonexistence of aggravating factors at the "guilt phase," leaving
the ultimate sentencing decision to the judge, then he would be
inclined to uphold its constitutionality.8 5 As a result of his fear
that the right to a jury trial was being threatened and of his
belief that all factual determinations must be found by a jury,
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment to overrule Walton and
86
to apply Apprendi to capital, as well as non-capital, cases.
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy expressed
his dislike for the holding in Apprendi. He recognized, however,
that it was binding precedent and that it could not co-exist with
the holding in Walton.8 7 Justice Breyer, concurring in the
judgment only, refused to accept the reasoning of Apprendi but
asserted that judicial sentencing in capital cases violated the
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
88
punishment.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, argued that Apprendi, and not Walton,
should have been overruled.8 9 In Justice O'Connor's view,
Apprendi's holding went against prior precedent and could not
be found anywhere in the Constitution. 90
In a parade of
horribles argument, Justice O'Connor warned, and perhaps
foreshadowed, that extending the reasoning of Apprendi to
capital sentencing would "unleash a flood of petitions by
convicted defendants" sitting on death row. 91

83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.

at 2444 (Scalia, J., concurring).
at 2445 (Scalia, J., concurring).

(Scalia, J., concurring).
(Scalia, J., concurring).

87 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 2446 (Breyer, J., concurring). The question of whether judicial
determination of capital sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment is beyond the
scope of this article.
89 Id. at 2448 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 2449 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

91 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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III. THE EFFECT OF RING ON STATE SYSTEMS
Although the decision in Ring resolved the constitutionality
of Arizona's death penalty system, it created many more
questions regarding capital sentencing systems in other states
around the country. Several commentators have criticized the
decision for not giving other state courts and legislatures a clear
rule or guide to determine whether their death penalty systems
are constitutional. 92 By analyzing each state system and
comparing it to the analysis and rules laid out in Ring, one can
determine which systems will stand after the decision and which
systems will be held unconstitutional and in conflict with the
general principles laid down in Ring.
A.

Introduction to the Different Death Penalty Systems

Of the fifty states in the United States, thirty-eight of them
have capital sentencing systems in some form or another. 93 Of
these thirty-eight states, thirty of them leave capital sentencing

92 See Melissa Harris, U.S. Court Upholds Freeze on Executions; The Federal
Ruling Allows Florida'sTop Court Time to Review the Death Penalty, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 11, 2002, at Al (quoting Bob Wesley, a Florida public defender, who

stated that "[Hight now we're all lost ... [tihe U.S. Supreme Court hasn't given us a
sufficient definition of what a constitutional death penalty is"); John Gibeaut, States
Revisit Death Sentence Cases, 1 A.B.A. J. 25, 28 (describing Florida capital counsel
Kevin Beck's belief that the Ring decision will cause Florida's sentencing system to
"com[e] to a grinding halt"); Charles Lane, Court: Judges Can't Impose Death

Penalty; Only Jury May Decide to Execute Defendant, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002,

at Al (quoting Kent Scheidegger, the legal director of the Sacramento Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation, who noted that "[elvery murderer on death row... will
attack his sentence").
93 See ARK. CODE. ANN.

§

5-4-602 (Michie 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3

(Deering 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-

46a (West 2001); GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-31.1 (2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1
(West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1)
(Michie 2001); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 905.1 (West 2002); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2001); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.030,
565.032 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 175.552 (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3120A-1 (Michie 2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-A-2000 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 2002); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2001); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-2 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2001); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.050 (West
2002); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 2001).
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decisions to the jury. 94 The remaining eight states leave the
95
ultimate decision of life or death to judicial determination.
These eight states will be directly affected by the decision in
Ring. In addition to Arizona, 96 three other states leave the
finding of aggravating and mitigating factors and the ultimate
sentencing decision entirely to judges. 97 The other four states
have hybrid systems where the jury renders an advisory verdict
of life or death but the judge makes the final sentencing
determination. 98 Each of these eight states takes at least some
responsibility for capital sentencing away from the jury and will
be directly affected by the holding in Ring.
B.

Effect on States with Sole JudicialDeterminations

The capital sentencing systems in Idaho, Montana, and
Nebraska all mirror that of Arizona and unconstitutionally allow
a sentencing judge, without a jury, to find the statutory
aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death
penalty. 99 In Montana, when a defendant is found guilty of firstdegree murder, "the judge who presided at the trial.., shall
conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the
existence or nonexistence of' aggravating circumstances. 10 0 This
separate sentencing system is to be held "before the court
alone." 1 1 A convicted defendant's sentence cannot be raised to
the death penalty without a judicial determination of the
existence of aggravating circumstances. Therefore, Montana's
capital sentencing system directly conflicts with the rule
announced in Ring that "[clapital defendants.., are entitled to a
94 Lane, supra note 93.

95 See Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Ruling Roils Death Penalty Cases, N.Y.

TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A14.
9r

See Ariz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001).

97 See Idaho CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301

(2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (2001).
98 See Ala. CODE § 13A-5-46 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4209 (2002); FLA. STAT.

ANN.§ 921.141 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West Supp. 2002).
99 Colorado used to allow a three-judge panel to conduct a sentencing hearing
following a defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and gave the panel the
power to impose the death penalty upon a finding of one aggravating factor. That
statute has recently been replaced with a system under which the jury determines
the presence of aggravating circumstances by a unanimous verdict. See John Sanko,
Governor Signs Death Penalty Law; Juries Will Make Life-or-Death Calls Instead of

Judges, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 13, 2002, at 2B.
no MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1).
101 Id.
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jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."'0 2 As a
result, Montana's capital sentencing system violates the Sixth
Amendment, and the Montana legislature will have to create a
system that leaves these factual determinations to the jury.
Similarly, in Idaho, "[a]fter a plea or verdict of [guilt for
first-degree murder,] the court shall convene a hearing to receive
evidence and argument in aggravation and mitigation." 0 3 As in
Montana, a convicted defendant cannot be given a death
sentence without judicial determination of aggravating
circumstances. It is therefore impossible to distinguish this
system from the Arizona system held unconstitutional in Ring.
Upon the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, the
two state systems are identical. Similar to Arizona's capital
sentencing system, which imposes the death penalty unless
"there are... mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial
to call for leniency," 10 4 Idaho requires a sentence of death unless
there are mitigating circumstances "sufficiently compelling that
the death penalty would be unjust."10 5 Recently, in light of this
problem, the Supreme Court of Idaho vacated a death sentence
and stated that Ring "appears to invalidate the death penalty
scheme in Idaho."10 6 As a result of the strong similarity between
both systems, it is hard to argue that Idaho's system is
constitutional after Ring.
Nebraska's legislature leaves the determination of facts
needed for imposition of a death sentence to either the presiding
trial court judge; a panel of three judges, including the presiding
judge and two other judges designated by the Nebraska Supreme
Court; or a panel of three judges named by the chief justice of
the Nebraska Supreme Court. 10 7 Although a panel of judges can
determine the presence of aggravating factors, Nebraska's
system unconstitutionally takes factual determinations out of
the hands of a jury. When the Nebraska Supreme Court hears
arguments on the validity of the state's death penalty system, 0 8
102 Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002).

See Idaho CODE § 19-2515(a) (Michie Supp. 2002).
ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (West Supp. 2002).
105 IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c).
106 State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (Idaho. 2002).
107 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (2001).
108 See Robynn Tysver, Death Penalty To Be Put on Trial in Nebraska; The
State Supreme Court Will Hear Arguments in November on Whether the Law is
103
104
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it will be hard to distinguish their system from the one found
unconstitutional in Ring. Justice O'Connor underscored this
point when she wrote that the Ring decision "effectively
declare[d]
five
States' capital
sentencing
schemes
unconstitutional." 10 9
C. Effect on States with Hybrid Systems
At the time of the decision in Ring, Florida, Alabama,
Indiana, and Delaware all had hybrid capital sentencing systems
where the jury recommends a life sentence or the death penalty
and a judge makes the final determination. 11 0 As a result of the
holding in Ring, the constitutionality of these state systems has
been questioned by legal experts around the country."'
Subsequently, some states have either stayed executions in
anticipation of a ruling on the constitutionality of their
systems 112 or redrafted their statutes to address future
problems. 1 3 Although these hybrid systems permit capital
juries to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors as a
whole, they still prevent specific fact finding by a jury and allow
judicial overrides of jury recommendations. Clearly, this method
is inconsistent with the fundamental policies of the Sixth
Amendment set forth in Ring.
In Florida, upon a conviction of first-degree murder, the
court holds a separate sentencing hearing at which the jury
determines "[wihether sufficient aggravating circumstances
Constitutional,OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 1, 2002, at 3B.
109 Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2449 (2002) (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
(speaking of Idaho; Montana; Nebraska; Colorado, which has since amended its law;
and Arizona).
110 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4209(d) (2002); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 2002).
111 See Gilbeaut, supra note 92, at 33 ("[P]rosecutors in Florida and Alabama
wondered where questions unanswered in Ring would hit them."); Lane, supra note
93, at Al (quoting Kent Schedegger, the legal director of the Sacramento based
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as saying, "Florida and Alabama have a difficult

argument to maintain the present system").
112 See Harris, supra note 92, at Al (stating that there may be no executions in
Florida for over a year in order to give the state's highest court time to rule on the

constitutionality of their state sentencing system).
113

See IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-50-2-9(e) (stating that "[flor a defendant sentenced

after June 30, 2002... [i]f the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation, the court
shall sentence the defendant accordingly") (emphasis added); see also Liptak, supra
note 95, at A14 (discussing how Delaware and Indiana have enacted new laws to
address Ring).
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exist;"" 4 "[wihether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances;" 115 and "[b]ased
on these considerations, whether the defendant should be
sentenced to life imprisonment or death."116 Regardless of the
jury's recommendation, the court has the authority to weigh the
117
circumstances on its own and enter a sentence of life or death.
Florida's highest court has required that the trial judge give
"great weight" to the jury's recommendation 18 and override that
recommendation only if "the facts... [are] so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."" 9
Despite this requirement, Florida judges have overridden jury
recommendations of life imprisonment over 140 times. 120
In order to determine whether Florida's sentencing system
is constitutional in light of Ring, it is necessary to review prior
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the constitutionality of
that system. In Proffitt v. Florida,'2 ' Spaziano v. Florida 22 and
Hildwin v. Florida,123 the United States Supreme Court upheld
Florida's sentencing system against several constitutional
attacks. Attorneys and politicians in Florida continue to cite
these decisions to support the constitutionality of Florida's
system. 124 As is the case with Walton, however, the principles in
these cases cannot coexist with the principles laid down in
Apprendi and Ring.
In Proffitt, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether Florida's capital sentencing system violates the Eighth
114

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(a).

Id. § 921.141(2)(b).
Id. § 921.141(2)(c).
117 Id. § 921.141(3) (stating that "[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a
majority of the jury, the court... shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or
death").
118 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
115
116

119 Id.
120 See

Scott E. Erlich, Comment, The Jury Override: A Blend of Politics and

Death, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1996).
121 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976) (upholding Florida's sentencing system against
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment attacks).
122 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984) (upholding Florida's sentencing system against
Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment challenges).
123 490 U.S. 638, 640 (1989) (upholding Florida's sentencing system against an
attack based on the Sixth Amendment).
124 See Linda Kleindienst, Court of Opinion; Attorneys Argue Before Justices
Over Death Penalty and Constitution,SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 22, 2002, at 8B (quoting
Justice Major Harding's statement that "the Supreme Court of the United States,
time after time, has said our death penalty passes muster").
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and Fourteenth Amendments. 125 In a majority opinion written
by Justice Powell, 126 the Court stated that "it has never [been]
suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required." 127
After the holding in Ring, requiring that any factor necessary to
increase a term of imprisonment to the death penalty must be
found beyond a reasonable doubt, 128 there is strong precedent

against judicial overrides of jury verdicts. Significantly, the
Proffitt Court held that "judicial sentencing [would] lead... to
even greater

consistency

in the imposition ... of capital

punishment." 129 Justice Powell concluded that trial judges have
more experience in sentencing and are better apt to impose
capital sentences. 30 This argument was specifically rejected in
Ring when the Court held that "[tihe Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, however, does not turn on... relative rationality,
fairness, or efficiency." 131 While few would dispute Justice
Powell's claim that trial judges possess greater experience and
knowledge about criminal law, 1 32 the founders adopted the Sixth

Amendment because they feared leaving a criminal defendant's
rights and liberties in the hands of one judge. 133 Specifically, the
founders sought to protect defendants from "a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers."134 Taken together,
the holding in Proffit does little to support the constitutionality
of Florida's capital sentencing regime. Instead, the decision
merely provides arguments about the sentencing knowledge of
judges and highlights the lack of precedent against judicial
125 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244.

126 Id. at 244. Justice Powell wrote an opinion in which Justices Stewart and
Stevens joined. Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment that
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment in a separate opinion, while Justices Brennan and Marshall each
dissented. Id. at 243-44.
127Id. at 252.
128 See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002) (noting that the Sixth

Amendment's protections would be virtually eliminated if not applied to an increase
in sentence to death).
129Proffit, 428 U.S. at 252.
130 Id. (recognizing that trial judges are able to "impose sentences similar to
those imposed in analogous cases").
131 Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442.
132 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
133 See

Welsh S. White, Note, Fact-Findingand the Death Penalty: The Scope of

a CapitalDefendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
134 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 540-41 (4th ed. 1873).
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determination of sentencing considerations. In sum, Proffit is no
more than a policy argument for upholding Florida's system.
In Spaziano, the Supreme Court again upheld Florida's
system against Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment attacks.
Countering the defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge, 135 the
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, held that
"[tihe fact that.., capital sentencing is like a trial.., does not
mean that it is like a trial in respects significant to the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial."1 36 He concluded that no
large risk exists that a state will use all of its resources to
arbitrarily impose the death penalty. 137 This argument would
fail today because the Sixth Amendment and the concerns
embodied within it now require a jury determination of any fact
138
that the legislature conditions an increase in sentencing upon.
Justice Blackmun also held that the sentencer holds
responsibility for ultimately determining aggravating and
mitigating circumstances because judges have traditionally
determined the sentence to be imposed. Ring directly overruled
this argument. As a result, Spaziano, like Proffitt, is outdated
and in direct conflict with the fundamental holding of Ring.
In Hildwin, the Supreme Court upheld Florida's sentencing
system despite a claim that it violated the Sixth Amendment by
permitting imposition of the death penalty without any specific
findings by the jury.139 In another short and generalized policy
140
argument, Justice Brennan expressed the view of the majority
that Florida's sentencing system is not "significant to the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial."' 4 ' Justice Brennan
voiced the argument presented in Walton, and overruled directly
135 The defendant also challenged Florida's statute on the grounds that it
violated the Eighth Amendment prevention of "cruel and unusual punishments."
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457 (1984). That question is beyond the scope of
this Note.
136 Id. at 459.
137 Id.
138 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000) (noting judges'
traditional discretion to impose sentences within a statutorily defined range based
upon facts determined by the jury and the "novelty" of a statutory process that
eliminated the jury's position to make factual determinations necessary to increase
the sentence beyond the maximum authorized by statute).
139 Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 639 (1989).
140 Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
formed a per curium opinion, while Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Id. at
638, 641.
141 Id. at 640 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)).
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by Ring, that "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury
sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of
fact."' 42 As stated earlier, the Supreme Court in Ring overruled
Walton to the extent that it distinguished between sentencing
considerations and elements of an offense and allowed judicial
fact finding of any elements necessary to increase a defendant's
sentence. 143 The arguments presented by the Court in Proffitt,
Spaziano, and Hildwin have been attacked and rejected in
Apprendi and Ring; these cases should be considered overruled
to the extent that they follow the policies wrongfully laid out in
Walton.
As with Florida, Alabama gives convicted defendants the
right to have a sentencing hearing before a jury, after which the
jury will return an advisory verdict based upon whether "one or
more aggravating circumstances... exist... [that] outweigh
[any] mitigating circumstances" present. 144 Alabama gives
defendants even less protection under the Sixth Amendment
because, unlike Florida's system that allows a judicial override
145
when reasonable minds could not have found as the jury did,
that
"[a]
jury's
the
standard
Alabama
follows
recommendation... is not binding upon the court" and can be
146
overridden with complete judicial discretion.
The Supreme Court has also held Alabama's system
constitutional. In Harris v. Alabama,147 Louise Harris appealed
after she received a death sentence from a judicial override of a
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. 148 Harris claimed
that Alabama's statute was unconstitutional because it failed to
specify how much weight a trial judge must give an advisory
verdict. 149 In a majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor, 150
the Court held that "a specific method for balancing mitigating
and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is

142

Id. (quoting

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)).

143See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002).
14 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(2) (2002).
145 See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
146

ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e).

147513 U.S. 504 (1995).
148 Id. at 507-08.
149 Id. at 505.

150 Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Breyer formed the majority, while only Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 505.
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[not] constitutionally required."15 1 The Court relied on Proffitt
and Walton and held that giving a trial judge discretion in
imposing a sentence in a capital case is consistent with
precedent. 152 Like Proffitt and Walton, this case cannot stand in
light of the modern Court's holdings in Apprendi and Ring;
Alabama takes the final determination of capital fact finding out
of the hands of the jury. This undermines the strong principles
laid down in Ring and leads to inconsistency among states across
the country. Allowing Alabama's sentencing system to remain
would send the message that it is wrong to have judicial fact
finding but not to have judicial overrides of jury fact finding.
At the time of the decision in Ring, Delaware and Indiana
had hybrid systems as well. 153 Unlike Florida and Alabama,
however, the Delaware and Indiana state legislatures enacted
new statutes that will take capital fact finding out of the hands
of a judge and put it into the hands of a jury. 5 4 This action was
necessary in order to be consistent with the fundamental
principles of the Sixth Amendment 155 and the rule laid down in
Ring and Apprendi 56 Florida politicians, such Governor Jeb
Bush, have purposely ignored the Supreme Court's message in
57
order to further their own political views on the death penalty.
This stance, however, only enforces the policy reason in support
of the Sixth Amendment: to ensure that criminal defendants'
trials are not unconstitutionally affected by political and
governmental beliefs. 58 Additionally, many defenders of state
systems like Florida's argue that a change to a jury system "will
cost taxpayers millions in 'wasted work' and could spawn years

151Id. at 512 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988)).
162 Id. at 509-10.

153 See DEL. CODE ANN.

§ 4209 (2002); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (West

Supp.2002).

154 See Liptak, supra note 95, at A14 (stating that Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,

Indiana, and Montana have all passed laws addressing the decision in Ring).
165 See White, supra note 133, at 3.
156 Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002).
157 Governor Bush tried several tactics to move up executions, including filing a

notice in support of a request to move ahead with executions and signing death
warrants for two inmates. His actions have been criticized as a "crass political move
at a time when Mr. Bush knows that the courts will issue stays in both cases."

Kleindienst, supra note 124, at Al.
158 See White, supra note 133, at 3 (noting "[flear of unchecked power, so typical
of our State and Federal Governments" is one of the reasons for the enactment of
the Sixth Amendment).
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of appeals."1 59 This argument is flawed; civil liberties granted by
the Constitution are not founded on tax dollars and court
efficiency. The legislatures of Alabama and Florida should
rewrite their statutes and give defendants the proper protection
embedded in the Sixth Amendment and expressed in Ring.
In conclusion, the hybrid systems are no more constitutional
than the systems with a direct judicial determination. Allowing
Florida and Alabama's systems to stand will leave inconsistency
among the states and undermine the policies of the Sixth
Amendment.
IV.

EFFECT OF RING ON CONVICTED DEFENDANTS SITTING ON

DEATH Row
The holding in Ring and the disruption it will bring to eight
state systems directly affects hundreds of convicted defendants
sitting on death row. Throughout the country, there are
approximately 3,700 convicted prisoners on death row. 160 In
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, systems that
allowed judicial determinations, there are 168 convicted
161
prisoners awaiting execution-including 129 in Arizona alone.
In Alabama, Florida, Delaware, and Indiana, the states162 with
Of
hybrid systems, there are 629 prisoners on death row.
163 The
those 629, 383 are in Florida, and 187 are in Alabama.
application of Ring to past and future death sentences will be
important because most, if not all, convicted defendants will
bring direct appeals 164 or habeas corpus petitions 165 in hope that
the holding in Ring will save their lives.
159 Carol Sowers & Elvia Diaz, Death-Penalty Law Change Decried; Attorneys
Complain of Extra Work, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 2002, at 6B.
160 See Lane, supra note 92, at Al.

161 Id. Colorado has changed its law since the Ring decision and no longer
allows for judicial determinations. See supra note 100.
162 See Lane, supra note 92, at Al.
163

Id.

164 Defendants sentenced to death under the State systems, who have not

exhausted their appeals, can appeal their sentences under the new holding in Ring.

165 See ORAN'S DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 223 (3d ed. 2000) (defining habeas

corpus as "[a] judicial order to someone holding a person to bring that person to
court. It is most often used to get a person out of unlawful imprisonment by forcing
the captor and the person being held to come to court for a decision on the legality of

the imprisonment"). A state prisoner can bring federal habeas corpus petitions if(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or (2) He is
in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of
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Rules of Retroactivity

In order for convicted defendants to successfully bring
appeals or habeas corpus petitions, the courts must first
determine whether the holding in Ring should be applied
retroactively.
Although a new rule cannot be applied
retroactively by the lower courts until the Supreme Court grants
permission, 6 6 it is possible to examine the rules the Supreme
Court has created and speculate as to whether it will apply Ring
retroactively.
In 1971, in a concurring opinion in Mackey v. United
States,167 Justice Harlan sought to clarify the federal rules for
retroactivity. 168 Frustrated that the question of retroactivity had
become a matter of judicial discretion, Harlan criticized past
precedent, claiming it had become "almost as difficult to follow
as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its intended
victim." 16 9 Justice Harlan first distinguished between matters
on direct review and matters on collateral review. 170 He stated
that new constitutional rules should always be applied to
matters on direct review because "a proper perception of our
duties as a court of law, charged with applying the Constitution
to resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct
review, mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not
as it once was." 17 1 As for cases brought on collateral review,
either by habeas corpus or a motion to vacate, he argued that

Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge
of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or (4) He, being a

citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act
done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege,
protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or
sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and
effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or (5) It is necessary to

bring him into court to testify or for trial.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2002). Federal prisoners can challenge their sentences by bringing
a motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2002).
166 See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001) ("[A] new rule is not 'made
retroactive to cases on collateral review' unless the Supreme Court holds it to be
retroactive.").
167 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
168 Id. at 676-77 (proclaiming "the time ha[s] come for us to pause to consider
just where [the courts] ... might be leading us").
169

Id.

170 Id. at 680-81.
171Id. at 681.
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there is a stronger policy toward finality. 172 Accordingly, he
concluded that it was better policy 173 to apply the law prevailing
at the time of the conviction rather than the new law prevailing
at the time of the petition. 174 Justice Harlan noted two
important exceptions, however, to the general rule that new laws
will not be applied retroactively on collateral review. First, he
recognized an exception for "[new 'substantive due process'
rules,.., those that place, as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority." 175 Secondly, he noted an exception for "those
procedures that... are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty'."1 76 Outside of these two narrow exceptions, Justice
Harlan sought to create a general premise that new rules should
be applied retroactively on direct appeal but not on collateral
review.
In 1989, as a result of the same concerns voiced by Justice
Harlan about inconsistent application of retroactivity, the
United States Supreme Court again sought to develop a clear
procedure for determining when laws should be applied
retroactively. 17 7 In Teague v. Lane, 7 8 the Court adopted and
expanded the rule developed by Justice Harlan. 179 The Court
held, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, that the first
step in a retroactivity analysis is to determine whether the case
upon which the petitioner relies on did in fact announce a new

172 Id.
at 683. He claimed that the Supreme Court's function in reviewing a
decision on direct review is much different from reviewing a decision by habeas
corpus, because there is an "interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of
repose." Id. at 682-83.
173 Justice Harlan stated," '[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and society
have an interest in insuring that there will.., be the certainty that comes with an
end to litigation'." Id. at 690 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25

(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

174 Id. at 688-89.
175 Id. at 692.
176 Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justice
Harlan states that, over time, there may be changes that "properly alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the
fairness of a particular conviction." Id.

177See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302 (1989) (stating that past precedent
has lead to inconsistent results).

178 Id. at 288.
179 Id. at 310.
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rule.180 Justice O'Connor stated that a case announces a new
rule "when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on
the States or Federal Government... [and] was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final."181 Thus, if the petitioner relied upon a case that did not
18 2
create a new rule, retroactivity would not be an issue.
Alternatively, if the case did enact a new rule, O'Connor
endorsed Justice Harlan's approach that new rules should be
applied retroactively to criminal cases on direct review but not
on collateral review. 8 3 In addition, the Court noted and adopted
Justice Harlan's two limited exceptions as the only exceptions
which permit retroactive application of new rules on collateral
review. 8 4 In concluding that "'the costs imposed upon the
State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional
law on habeas corpus ...generally far outweigh the benefits of
this application,' "185 the Court adopted Justice Harlan's general
rule that new rules can be retroactively applied to cases on
direct, but not collateral, review.1 86
B. Applying the Rule to Ring
As stated above, the first step in a retroactivity analysis is to
determine whether the case relied upon created a new rule of
law. 8 7 Convicted defendants on death row will rely upon the
rule established in Ring that "[c] apital defendants, no less than
non-capital defendants ...are entitled to a jury determination of
any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment." 8 8 As stated earlier, Justice O'Connor
defined a new rule as one that "breaks new ground or imposes a
new obligation on the States or Federal Government... [and]
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final." 18 9 It is clear that the new

180 Id. at 301.
181

Id.

182 See id.
183 Id. at 304-05.
184 Id. at 307.
186 Id. at 310 (alteration in original) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638,

654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 301.

188 Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002).
189 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
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rule in Ring imposes a novel obligation on the states because it
effectively overruled the capital sentencing systems in five states
and threw the constitutionality of four more into question. As a
result, several state legislatures had to re-write their statutes to
place the determination of aggravated factors in the hands of the
jury, and the courts in these states will be flooded with capital
appeals for the next few years. 190
A more difficult question is whether the holding in Ring was
dictated by existing precedent. Some scholars would argue that
the holding was not a new rule but rather an application of the
rule stated in Apprendi, which is that any fact upon which the
legislature conditions an increase in sentencing upon must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 1 Justice Powell
once suggested that retroactivity should not be addressed when
the Court "merely has applied settled precedents to new and
different factual situations."1 92 The rule in Apprendi was not
settled precedent for capital sentencing at the time that Ring
Previously, the Supreme Court upheld the
was decided.
constitutionality of judicial determination of aggravating factors
necessary to impose the death penalty. 193 Therefore, although
Apprendi was the rule applied in non-capital cases, the Court
still considered Walton precedent for capital cases. The holding
of Ring that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
extends to the determination of aggravating circumstances in
capital cases was not existing precedent. Therefore, it was the
enactment of a new constitutional rule for retroactivity purposes.
The second step in a retroactive analysis is to determine
whether the particular case is being appealed by direct or
collateral review 194 with the understanding that cases on direct
review, but not collateral review, are entitled to retroactive

190
191
192
193

See Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442 n.6.
Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000).
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982).
See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995)

(upholding the

constitutionality of a jury override); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990)

(holding Arizona's sentencing system constitutional); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S.
638, 640-41 (1989) (upholding a Sixth Amendment challenge to the jury override
system); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984) (stating there is no

constitutional requirement that the jury's recommendation of life be final); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) ("[Ilt has never [been] suggested that jury
sentencing is constitutionally required.").
194 Teague, 489 U.S. at 304-05.
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application of new rules. 195 In accordance with this principle,
any convicted defendants on death row who have not yet
exhausted their right of direct appeal will be entitled to the
benefit of the holding in Ring and should be resentenced by a
jury determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Denial of the benefit of this rule on direct appeal would
undermine the considerations of fairness embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the jury trial
right of the Sixth Amendment.
Conversely, and as stated above, new rules should not be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 196 This is
unfortunate for the many defendants on death row who have
exhausted their appeals and may be entitled only to habeas
corpus petitions. 197
Although the general rule excludes
retroactivity to cases on collateral review, 198 the next step in the
analysis is to consider whether the rule laid down in Ring falls
within one of the two exceptions created by the Court. 199
The first exception applies to new rules that "[place] a class
of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe."2 0
In 1990, the Supreme Court held that a rule that prevented a
bar on mitigating evidence in capital sentencing was not the type
of rule that fell within the exception because it "would neither
decriminalize a class of conduct nor prohibit the imposition of
capital punishment on a particular class of persons."20 1 A rule
holding unconstitutional any attempt to exclude mitigating
circumstances from capital sentencing determinations is closely
parallelled to the capital sentencing rule established in Ring.
Judicial determinations of aggravating circumstances do not
impose the death penalty upon a particular class of persons, nor
do they decriminalize a particular type of conduct. In Mackey,
Justice Harlan gave two reasons for enacting this exception.
First, "[t]here is little societal interest in permitting the criminal
195 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 688-89 (1971).
196 Id.

197See id. (discussing the habeas petition and judicial review generally).
198 See Lane, supra note 92, at Al.
199 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (explaining Justice Harlan's two exceptions to
the general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review).
200 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539 (1997).

201 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1990) (holding that a new rule
requiring the consideration of mitigating circumstances in capital sentencing does

not meet either of the two exceptions in Teague).
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process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to
repose," 20 2 and second, the "issuance of the writ on substantive
due process grounds [brings no threat of retrial]."203 Applying
the holding in Ring would directly contradict these policies since
it does not involve abolishing particular conduct that was once
illegal and it would bring about a substantial increase in appeals
and resentencing, undermining the notion of finality relied upon
by Justice Harlan.
The second exception allows for the retroactive application of
new rules to cases on collateral review if they are "'watershed
rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." 204 Justice
Harlan stated that "any conviction free from federal
constitutional error at the time it became final, will be found,
fair."20 5
upon reflection, to have been fundamentally
Additionally, in Teague, the Court stated that there were two
requirements for the retroactive application of a rule on
collateral review: first the rule must be necessary to prevent an
"'impermissibly
large risk that the innocent will be
convicted;' "206 second, the rule "must implicate the fundamental
20 7
fairness of the trial."
In the case of Ring, having a jury determine the existence of
aggravating factors does not necessarily create a large risk that
an innocent defendant will be convicted. Judicial determinations
of aggravating factors, although they violate the principles of the
Sixth Amendment, have certain safeguards, including full
sentencing hearings where the defense can present evidence of
mitigating circumstances and abuse-of-discretion reversals on
appellate review. Although the Sixth Amendment was designed
to place a defendant's fate in the hands of twelve citizens who
reflect the voice of the community, 208 judicial determination of
aggravating circumstances does not necessarily present the kind
of threat to fundamental fairness contemplated and feared by
202 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693.
203 Id.
204 Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 539 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311

(1989)).
205 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693.

206 Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262
(1969)).
207 Id.
208 See White, supra note 134, at 3.
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Justice Harlan. 20 9 In addition, having judicial determination of
aggravating circumstances does not violate "the fundamental
fairness of the trial"210 because there is no implication that
judges would impose a risk on a defendant's right to fair trial. In
fact, a jury might be more likely than a judge to impose the
death penalty improperly based on emotion. In conclusion,
although the defendant should be entitled to a jury
determination of any fact beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury
determination of aggravating circumstances in capital
sentencing is not the type of procedure "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" 211 that the Court intended for retroactive
application.
Since the new rule enacted in Ring fails to meet either of the
exceptions laid down in Teague, defendants convicted by judicial
determination of aggravated factors will only be able to appeal
their convictions if they have not yet exhausted their direct
appeals.
Whether defendants have exhausted their direct
appeals is a question to be determined on a case-by-case basis by
each defendant's attorney and the Court, if necessary. Because
only the Supreme Court has the power to apply a new rule
retroactively, 212 the rules for retroactivity embodied in the
Supreme Court's precedent must be followed. As a result, many
convicted defendants sitting on death row will not be able to take
advantage of the new rule in Ring unless the Court decides to
develop a new exception to the fundamental rules laid down in
Teague. As more and more appeals flood the courts within the
next few years, it is most likely that only those on direct review
will be heard.
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Ring v. Arizona was an unprecedented
decision and the first decision in over thirty years to invalidate a
209 Justice Harlan uses the example of the deprivation of the right to counsel as
one rule that would fit within the fundamental fairness exception because it brings
about a substantial risk that innocent people will be convicted. See Mackey, 401 U.S.

at 693-94. This writer believes that putting the determination of aggravating
circumstances in the hands of a judge is as large a risk to the innocent as not having
the right to counsel.
210 Teague, 489 U.S. at 312.

211 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
212 See supra note 167.
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state capital sentencing system. 213 It is a widely controversial
and monumental decision that will have extensive implications
across the country. One commentator stated that the decision
will at least "buy everyone on death row in these . . . states
another 7.5 years of life. That's the average length of time it
takes to go from imposition of the death sentence to
execution." 214 Ring's impact in Florida and Alabama, where
capital sentencing is still based on a jury override system, is left
to be determined by the courts. If the Supreme Court allows
these systems to stand, the strong policies emphasized in Ring
and embodied in the Sixth Amendment will be undermined.
Further, state systems that permit judges to reverse fact-finding
decisions by a jury will remain intact, leaving the kind of
inconsistency among systems that Ring was designed to fix. As
far as the convicted defendants on death row are concerned, the
arguments brought out by Arizona prosecutors that "Ring
doesn't apply to . . . death row prisoners who already have
exhausted their direct appeals" 215 are correct. In addition, in
Florida and Alabama, those convicted defendants who have not
exhausted their direct appeals will face a large hurdle if they
were sentenced to death after a jury recommendation of death.
Regardless of how many death row inmates are successful in
retroactivity arguments, the Ring case will have a large impact
on the future of capital sentencing. From this point forward,
every state will have to place capital fact finding in the hands of
a jury, making death determinations almost entirely the voice of
the community. By its holding, the Supreme Court properly
advanced the fundamental right to a jury trial embodied in the
Sixth Amendment and gave future defendants the full
protections they deserve under the Constitution. Ring v. Arizona
properly resolved ambiguities created by precedent, but most
importantly, it upheld the protections given to the citizens of this
country by the Bill of Rights.

213

See Lane, supra note 92, at Al.

214

Id.

215

Gibeaut, supra note 92, at 27.
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